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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper embarks on rationalizing the significance of codification of a convention for development of shared oil and 
gas resources under the supervision by International Law Commission (ILC). Transboundary natural resources would 
be discovered increasingly by development of technology that helps the States to exploit in any region and depth, and 
in adverse circumstances. The legal intricacies affecting such resources under international law originates from some 
significant factors such as complexity of oil and gas ownership, lack of international organization, association or 
convention to directly enforce the related rules for or against the States. Moreover, the States’ practice to cooperate 
through agreements are operationalised through various frameworks in different regions in the world. They are 
inconsistencies in the structure, provisions and regime of application due to their national interests, economic systems 
and goals and historical and political backgrounds. This paper reviews the relevant international law sources in an 
analytical and explanatory method and a theoretically doctrinal way to prove the reason why codification of a 
comprehensive model agreement in International Law Commission (ILC) would be the most efficient way to overcome 
such legal intricacies and lack of relevant international law rules. The significance and necessity of a universally 
binding convention is justified through this paper. The predominant provisions and main principles that can be 
included in the model agreement as a potential annex to the convention are illustrated, along with the applicability of 
the codification of both convention and a model agreement in the International Law Commission (ILC). 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Artikel ini dimulakan dengan merasionalkan kepentingan mengkodifikasikan Konvensyen berkenaan pembanguna 
sumber minyak dan gas yang dikongsi di bawah pengawasan Suruhanjaya Undang-Undang Antarabangsa. Sumber 
semula jadi rentas sempadan yang wujud didapati melalui peningkatan pembangunan teknologi yang membantu 
negara-negara untuk mengeksploitasi di mana-mana bahagian dan kedalaman carian serta begitu juga keadaan 
sebaliknya. Perundangan kompleks yang menjejaskan sumber semula jadi di bawah undang-undang antarabangsa 
berpunca daripada faktor-faktor penting seperti kerumitan dalam pemilikan minyak dan gas, kekurangan organisasi 
antarabangsa, konvensyen yang secara langsung berkaitan dikenakan peraturan terhadap negara atau sebaliknya. 
Tambahan pula, amalan negara dalam bekerjasama melalui perjanjian dijalankan melalui pelbagai kerangka kerja di 
rantau yang berbeza di dunia ini. Terdapat ketidakseragaman dalam struktur, peruntukan dan rejim pemakaian 
disebabkan oleh kepentingan negara, sistem ekonomi serta latar belakang sejarah dan politik. Artikel ini mengkaji 
sumber undang-undang yang relevan dengan menggunakan kaedah analitis dan penerangan serta doktrin teoretikal 
untuk membuktikan bahawa kodifikasi model perjanjian komprehensif dalam Suruhanjaya Undang-Undang 
Antarabangsa merupakan cara yang lebih efisien untuk menangani isu berkenaan. Kepentingan dan keperluan 
konvensyen yang mengikat kan dijustifikasikan dalam artikel ini. Peruntukan penting dan prinsip utama yang boleh 
dimasukkan dalam model perjanjian sebagai tambahan potensi kepada konvensyen akan diperihalkan termasuk 
kebolehpakaian kodifikasi kedua-dua konvensyen dan model perjanjian dalam Suruhanjaya Undang-Undang 
Antarabangsa. 
 
Kata kunci: Minyak dan sumber gas yang dikongsi bersama, perjanjian model, Suruhanjaya Undang-Undang 
Antarabangsa, kerjasama 
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INTRODUCTION 
The advancement and progression of 
technology to explore and exploit petroleum 
reservoirs at depths that were not accessible 
to humans in the past decades have made 
states greedier to extend their jurisdiction to 
the adjoining maritime areas. Most of the 
earth's surface is covered by water; thus, 
mineral resources exist in the marine area of 
the earth. Petroleum is one of the significant 
non-renewable natural resources that is vital 
for governments to exploit in optimum ways 
and inject this wealth into the economy for 
the development of the country's economy 
and citizens’ welfare. Agreements between 
States that have petroleum in their shared 
border areas are essential for their peaceful 
development and management.  
 At the present situation, international 
law is not able to oblige the States legally to 
cooperate in the development of shared oil 
and gas deposits, since there exists no 
binding convention or customary 
international law rule.
1
 The principle of 
cooperation in shared natural resources is 
reflected clearly in some rules in United 
Nations Convention on Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) 1982 and 1958, UN general 
assembly resolutions, international 
adjudications and general principles of law, 
but they are not obligatory and 
comprehensive enough to be enforced 
directly by any international authority.
2
 In 
other words, advisory and recommendatory 
tone of provisions and that fact that shared oil 
and gas resources subject is not specifically 
articulated in such international law sources. 
The principle of cooperation is summarized 
in international law, in negotiation in good 
faith, the peaceful settlement of disputes, 
clarification and identification of their claims 
over disputed area, determination of disputed 
area, consultation in good faith prior to 
exploitation and exercising of self-restrain 
and refraining from the use of force or threat 
to use force against the neighbouring.
3
  
 The disparity and inconsistency of the 
types of the agreements practiced by the 
states to develop such resources would be 
another problem that have the role of 
blocking the course of formation of an 
obligation formed as customary international 
law.
4
 Types of agreement are meant to be 
three common model of agreements; Single-
state Model, Compulsory Joint Venture 
System, and Joint Authority Model which are 
articulated in section 2.1 of this paper. In this 
regards, devising a comprehensive model 
agreement would be the most rational way in 
this circumstances, the only source of 
motivation and encouragement to bring the 
States to the table of negotiation.
5
 Such 
model agreement should be able to oblige the 
States to practice it in development of newly 
discovered natural resources, shared between 
two or more States in the condition that such 
model agreement would be an annex of an 
international law convention on shared 
natural resources. International Law 
Commission is an organ of the United 
Nations that can develop and codify a set of 
law or a model agreement as an obligatory 
law to force the States to cooperate in 
development of such resources.
6
 International 
Law Commission has two significant 
missions in international law; one is 
progressive development and the other is 
codification of international law (Article 1.1 
of ILC Statute). Progressive development 
refers to the preparation of draft conventions 
on subjects which have not yet been 
regulated by international law or where the 
law has not yet been sufficiently developed 
by state practice.
7
 Codification refers to the 
more precise formulation and systematization 
of rules of international law in fields where 
there already has been extensive State 
practice precedent and doctrine (Smith 2003). 
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International Law Commission (ILC) 
commenced the consideration of shared 
natural resources in its long-term programme 
of work in 2000.
8
 The ILC at its fifty-eighth 
session, in 2006, adopted 19 draft articles on 
the law of transboundary aquifers. Aquifers 
refers to as an underground geological 
formation, or group of formations, containing 
water. In the next session on 2008, the 
commission decided to separate the subject of 
oil and gas from the process of codification 
of a draft for the law of transboundary 
aquifers (The Work of the International Law 
Commission, 8
th
 Edition, 2012). After the 
adoption of the law of transboundary aquifers 
in 2008, the ILC decided in its sixty second 
session, in 2010, not to continue the subject 
of transboundary oil and gas in the its long-
term programme of work.  
 Natural resources are one of the most 
precious and unique resource for the States to 
enable them to provide capitals for 
development of their own countries. In the 
future, the States would have more 
investment and concentration to explore and 
exploit such resources.
9
 This perspective to 
the natural resources have two main results. 
One is the completion, unilateral exploitation 
and potential dispute over such resources and 
the other is the potential adverse effects and 
pollution of the marine environment.
10
 
Therefore, significant goals are to prevent 
international conflicts and threats to 
international peace and security and to 
protect maritime environment. To achieve 
such goals, international law should strive to 
formulate a law or binding rules for the 
development of shared natural resources 
specifically oil and gas resources. In this 
paper, the significance of codification of a 
convention on shared oil and gas resources is 
rationalized and the main principles and 
provisions of a model agreement as the annex 
to such convention is elaborated.  
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW RELEVANT 
RULES 
 
Generally interpreting, after exploring the 
international law sources including, the 
United Nation Convention on the Law of the 
Sea
11
, the work of the International law 
commission, United Nations general 
assembly resolutions, international 
environmental law, States’ practice and 
agreements among them, customary 
international law, general principles of law, 
international adjudications and the works of 
different authors and scholars, it is inferred 
that in international law there exists no 
convention or authority to directly regulate, 
legislate and manage oil and gas laws 
especially shared oil and gas resources. 
Extensive number of international law 
sources of different quality insists on the 
principle of cooperation in development of 
transboundary oil and gas fields.  
 In reviewing the legal system of 
ownership over petroleum fields, it is 
understood that unilateral exploitation of 
shared oil and gas resources in the federal 
countries has been restricted greatly in their 
domestic law. States’ Conservation agencies 
or committee in United States to regulate oil 
and gas conservation law have settled 
problems and disputes over oil and gas 
resources to a great extent.
12
 Private 
ownership in this country is legal, although it 
has been restricted by oil and gas 
conservation statutes in every oil-rich state. 
Oil and gas statutes in states protect their 
rights and interests in their contractual 
relationship with oil companies. 
 The relevant rules are UN General 
Assembly resolutions, the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States and 
UN Environmental Program and Interim 
provisional measures and arrangement in 
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articles in articles 74 (3) and 83 (3) of 
UNCLOS 1982 obliging states, in case of 
delimitation dispute, to “make every effort to 
enter into provisional arrangements of a 
practical nature”. This obligation is also 
strengthened and approved by bilateral state 
practice to include “mineral deposit clause” 
in their delimitation agreements and 
arranging in cooperative agreement to 
preserve unity of deposit and avoid 
competitive unilateral exploration and 
exploitation of shared natural resources. 
International Court of Justice in North Sea 
continental shelf cases affirmed that such 
similar clauses would be “potentially of a 
fundamentally norm-creating character”. 
 After examining 1982 Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, it is inferred that coastal 
states have sovereign rights in continental 
shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ). 
Consequently, all mineral and natural 
resource of the seabed and sub-seabed that 
are located in these areas, the exclusive 
economic zone and continental shelf is 
recognized; but these rules are effective as 
long as there is no interference of sovereignty 
claim between the countries [UN General 
Assembly Resolution (UNGAR), 1803/XVH 
of December 14, 1962]. In case of such 
claims, the delimited agreement should be 
referred to. In the absence of maritime 
delimitation agreement, the member States of 
the 1982 Convention should practice 
practical actions in the basis of interim 
measures in such a way that do not endanger 
the final agreement [Articles 74, Paragraph 3, 
UNCLOS 1982]. Besides these arrangements 
of the Convention that can be the basis of 
cooperative and correlative development of 
shared oil and gas resources, the principle of 
cooperation for exploitation of such deposits 
is repeated emphatically in several 
international adjudications as well. The 
interim measures can be recognized 
throughout international law, especially 
various provisions of UNCLOS 1982, United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 
Resolutions (UNGAR), States practices and 
general principles of international law relevant 
to shared oil and gas resources and interim 
measures: 1) to exchange information and 
prior consultation [UN GA Resolution 3281 
(XXIX)], 2) to avoid exploratory actions 
leading to permanent changes in the 
environment, 3) to agree upon temporary 
measures in the light of understanding and 
cooperation, 4) to avoid any action that would 
impair the process of reaching a final 
agreement, 5) to respect the rights and 
interests of any costal states, 6) not to cause 
considerable damage, 7) to agree on optimum 
use of such resources, 8) appropriate 
compensation for any exploitation from a 
shared reservoir without any prior notice to 
the other party, 9) to determine the area 
around the boundary line not to be exploited 
for a specific period. 
 Protective perimeters (interim 
measures) which are recognised as significant 
provisions in States’ agreement are 
enumerated in brief as follows: 
 When one party discovers an oil and 
gas reservoir that is approved by geological 
geophysical data to be extended into the other 
party’s continental shelf, the first party must 
notify the latter party accordingly by such 
technical data [Article 2(1), Netherlands & 
Germany Delimitation Agreement 1971]. 
Appropriate compensation is thought up in 
delimitation agreements in the event that one 
party extract from a transboundary reservoir 
without any prior notice to the other party 
[Article 4(2) of France and Spain Delimitation 
Agreement 1974, Article 2(2) Netherlands & 
Germany Delimitation Agreement 1971]. 
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STATES PRACTICE 
 
Respecting  the State practice in the subject 
of shared oil and gas deposits, a large number 
of coastal states whether having opposite or 
adjacent continental shelves have adopted 
and applied cooperation for managing 
correlatively shared oil and gas deposits.
13 
Such cooperation appears in the context of 
joint development agreement and 
international unitisation agreement such as; 
Saudi Arabia-Bahrain Agreement (1958),   
Qatar – Abu Dhabi Agreement (1969), Japan 
– South Korea Agreement of 30 January 
(1974), France – Spain Agreement of (1974), 
Argentina – United Kingdom Joint 
Declaration (1995), Malaysia – Thailand 
Joint Development Agreement (1979 and 
1990), Nigeria-Sao Tome Joint Development 
Agreement (2001) and various other 
agreements of the same category.  Regardless 
the increasing numbers of such cooperation, 
their geographical diversity disprove any 
attempt to reject their repeated occurrence as 
merely coincidental. 
14 
The differences in the 
structures of joint development agreements 
originates from their policies, the specific 
plans they design for cooperation and 
specificities of each case. Such verities, 
disparity and pragmatic nature of these 
agreements specify the inconsistency in the 
States practices in development of shared oil 
and gas resources; therefore, such States 
practices are in primitive course to be 
developed as customary international law and 
formation of customary international law is 
very difficult or impossible for the joint 
development agreement.   
 Joint development agreements of 
shared oil and gas resources are executed in 
various models by the states involved.
14
 The 
three recognized models are as follows; 
 
1. Single State Model: The simplest choice in 
operational stage requiring the lowest amount 
of struggles and challenges of development 
for the interested states in which one state 
undertakes the development management of 
the reserve situated in a disputed zone on 
behalf of the other state. Examples are the 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain Agreement 1958 
(UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16, UN Sales, No. 
E/F.74.V2 (1974), Australia and Indonesia 
(1989) and Norway and England Agreement 
(2005). 
 
 New tendency towards such model 
was enhancement to the growth of good-
neighborly relations, economical 
consideration. As an example of recent 
agreement to avoid such risk of state 
autonomy, is the Norway and England 
agreement 2005, in which both countries that 
have 35 years of experience in cooperation of 
petroleum exploitation, agreed that in case of 
existence of a shared field or reservoir 
between them the state in which most extent 
of the reserve is located, would develop the 
field unilaterally and the agreed revenue will 
be shared afterwards.
15 Compulsory Joint 
Venture System Model is an agreement in 
which states and any other relevant oil 
company from each state or those granted a 
concession are agreed to establish a joint 
venture for development of  every aspect of 
the project in the area.
16
  Examples of such 
model are Japan and South Korea Agreement 
(1974) and the agreement between France 
and Spain (1974) in the Bay of Biscay that 
was adopted a day before Japan and South 
Korea Agreement. The agreed zone is 
divided between France and Spain with 
separate jurisdiction and sovereign rights. 
The concessionaries of either interested state 
applying to develop the zone are urged to 
enter into joint venture with the nominee of 
the other party on an equal bases. Financial 
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affairs and costs is in proportion to their 
shares (1988).
17 
1. Joint Authority Model is the third and the 
most efficient and complex option requiring 
highest level of cooperation in an institute, 
managing board, administrative council or 
commission consisted of the influential 
authorities in each position equally from the 
interested states. International joint authority 
under joint development agreement has gained 
legal personality and adequate decision-
making powers to manage development zone. 
Comparing to the above-mentioned models 
that jeopardize the reduction of national 
autonomy, it is the best method of wide 
ranging cooperation and prevent any possible 
intervention to sovereign rights of either 
states.
18
  
 
On analysing and studying state practice and 
varieties of bilateral agreements among them, 
it should be noted that the practice of so-
called specially affected States enhances 
considerably to the determination of any rule 
of customary international law.
19
 For 
instance, the judgment in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases, underlies the role of 
the practice of the specially affected States. 
Regarding the principle of cooperation in 
general in the form of unitization and joint 
development agreement and considering to 
customary international law, it can also be 
inferred that first requirement and factors of 
customary international law formation as 
state practice has been settled and achieved to 
a great extent.  An ongoing process of 
customary international law formation 
includes following element as an integral 
parts:  
1. The degree of consistency and 
uniformity of the state practice;   
2. The generality and length of the state 
practice;   
3. The interests of specially affected 
States. 
 
 Two necessary elements for formation 
of customary international law are the 
consistent states practice as a widespread or 
universal act and the belief that such practice 
is required, prohibited or allowed as law 
(opinio juris). Both elements are not 
satisfactorily achieved for considering and 
practicing of joint development agreement as 
a customary international law. 
 Considering the international 
adjudications, the separate opinion of Judge 
Jessup in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases is mentioned as an evidence, where he 
notes that the principle of international 
cooperation is well established under 
customary international law [North Sea 
Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Judgment, ICJ 
Report 1969]. Although by reviewing the 
agreement for development of shared oil and 
gas deposits, joint development agreement 
along with joint authority is the most optimal 
efficient and advanced agreement. 
 It has not reached to a degree that 
embodies it as a remedy for resolving 
sovereign disputes, since efficient 
arrangements of joint development agreement 
require very high degree of cooperation in all 
aspects of bilateral international relations and 
this degree of cooperation cannot be 
recognized everywhere equivalently in the 
same level and quality. These agreement 
reached for development of transboundary oil 
and gas resources, none of them was 
accomplishment less than 5 years. Kashani 
(2010) said that the process of drafting, 
signing and ratification and entering into 
force took more than 5 years. Consequently, 
devising a model agreement or a convention 
to oblige the states to cooperate and detour 
unilateral exploitation is the best remedy and 
shortcut to overcome such legal complexity 
in international law.   
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INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 
ATTEMPT FOR CODIFICATION OF AN 
AGREEMENT FOR SHARED NATURAL 
RESOURCES 
A group of United Nations (UN) experts and 
International Law Commission (ILC) 
recognized that a need has arisen for 
establishment of rules governing the 
development of shared natural resources and 
this was the beginning of a difficult and 
challenging process for International Law 
Commission (ILC) whether they can get any 
success or solution for this crucial issue.  
 The attempt to adopt norms and 
regulations in United Nations for shared 
natural resources is not novel. It goes back to 
the 1970s when several relevant UN General 
Assembly resolutions were adopted without 
resulting in any brilliant legal solution 
[UNGA Resolution 3129 (1973), UNGA 
Resolution 3281, (1974)]. Schwebel (1980) 
said that the ILC commenced its work on the 
law of non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses since international watercourse 
is a sort of shared natural resources passing 
through the boundaries and they had been 
potential to cause international conflicts and 
disputes. The work on the Convention on the 
Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses was accomplished 
after 24 years strive and it was adopted by 
United Nations on 21 May 1994 and 
convention was opened for the States 
accession on 1997 (General Assembly 
Resolution 51/229). This convention entered 
into force after being ratified by 35 states,
 
based on article 36 of the Convention.  
 It can be inferred that the core of this 
convention is made up of broad substantial 
and procedural rules such as obligation not to 
cause significant harm and management of 
the resource equitably and rationally, general 
obligation to cooperate (Article 8), exchange 
of information (Article 9) and prior 
notification of planned measures (Article 12). 
During the establishment of such convention, 
the commission was going to include the 
international transboundary aquifers (A body 
of permeable rock that can contain or 
transmit groundwater) in this convention as 
well. Eventually they recognized that the 
international aquifers are complicated issue 
and reaching the agreement would be very 
difficult in case of inclusion of this issue in 
the Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (1997).  The ILC commenced 
investigation on the subject of shared natural 
resources on 2002 after the inclusion of the 
issue on the long term programme of work. 
The challenging question for the ILC 
remained whether the Commission should 
consider the topics of Shared Natural 
Resources (international aquifer and oil and 
gas) in one document or it had to prepare a 
separate document for both topics.
20
 While 
the first Special Rapporteur Rosenstock 
supported the separation of the topics, the 
second Special Rapporteur Yamada 
expressed his firm belief on the separation of 
these two topics.
21
 Yamada included in his 
work program the finalization of the topic of 
international aquifer on 2004, 
accomplishment of shared oil and gas 
resources on 2005 and achieving to a 
comprehensive conclusion in both topics on 
2006. He argued that despite the similarities 
on the application, transboundary nature, 
legal norms and the location of their 
occurrence, there are fundamental differences 
between the topics. Finally, the 6
th
 
commission approved the agenda as shared 
natural resources and Mr. Yamada announced 
by a report to the General Assembly on 
August 2007 that the drafts of confined 
groundwater have been sent to the states for 
comments and observation on it and the work 
of the ILC would no longer resume till the 
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collection of the state’s reply, its review and 
potential modification and final report on 
2008 [Official Reports of General Assembly 
62nd session, supplement no. 10 (A/62/10), 
paras 161-166]. It was decided to discuss oil 
and gas topic in the second part and after 
finalization of the first part which is 
international aquifer [Official Reports of 
General Assembly 62nd session, supplement 
no. 10 (A/62/10), paras 177]. Some delegates 
of Greece, Indonesia, Mexico, Poland and 
Portugal proposed that once the Commission 
had accomplished its codification on 
groundwaters, the oil and gas as the other 
topic of shared natural resources should 
become the main concern of the Commission 
[A/CN.4/580, (17 July 2007), para. 5]. The 
commission presented 2 ways based on the 
states’ comments and interpretation of the 
Working Group responsible for the topics and 
the proposal of the special rapporteur 
[A/CN.4/580, (17 July 2007), para. 5]. One is 
to issue the document in the form of a 
General Assembly resolution and the draft 
articles to be annexed to its resolution and 
recommending that States concerned make 
appropriate bilateral and regional 
arrangements for the proper management of 
their transboundary aquifers on the basis of 
the principles enunciated in the draft articles, 
the other is to develop the draft to form a 
convention to be approved and opened to be 
ratified by states [Yearbook of International 
Law Commission, 2008, paras. 37 and 49]. 
 The approved draft of the 
Commission, titled “Shared Natural 
Resources, the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifer” has one introduction, 4 parts and 19 
articles [Official Records of the General 
Assembly, Sixty-third Session, Supplement 
No. 10 (A/63/10)]. Article 5 is the most 
fundamental and can be considered as the 
focal point of the law of transboundary 
aquifer. The gist of discussion on shared 
natural resources is that the interested states 
would be able to benefit their own share from 
it. This article restricts unilateral exploitation 
from international aquifer in a soft language. 
In such an event the exploitation of the 
resources be the other partner should be done 
by prior and regular informing and data 
exchange and attempt to establish bilateral 
cooperation. Article 5, concerns equitable 
and reasonable utilization of aquifers. The 
question is that such rules as reasonable 
equitable utilization for international 
underground water cannot be applied for the 
oil and gas resources characterized as fluid 
and migratory substances. 
 It can be concluded based on the 
Commission efforts and works on the topic of 
shared natural resources and the viewpoints 
of the involved groups that for the time being 
we cannot expect these articles to be an 
effective draft and binding rules. They 
believed that the 19 articles of the law are not 
capable of being a document as effective as a 
convention. No instrument for dispute 
settlement is advised and in the final articles 
no procedures for approval, ratification and 
entering into force is considered.
22
 Despites 
these defects in the documents and the 
differences between oil and gas topic and 
transboundary aquifer law, there are some 
aspects and general principles that can be 
relevant to oil and gas such as sovereignty, 
equitable and reasonable utilization of the 
resources, the obligation not to cause 
significant harm, general obligation to 
cooperate .
23
   
 On the 57
th
 session the Special 
Rapporteur proposed to address 
transboundary groundwaters, oil and natural 
gas, taking a step-by-step approach, 
beginning with groundwaters and after this 
the other relevant topics such as oil and 
natural gas [Fifty-seventh Session of the 
General Assembly, Supplement No. 10 
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(A/57/10), paras. 518-519]. As mentioned in 
previous paragraphs, at its sixtieth session, in 
2008, the Commission adopted, on the 
second reading, a preamble and a set of 19 
draft articles on the law of transboundary 
aquifers, with the recommendation that the 
General Assembly, inter alia, consider the 
elaboration of a convention on the basis of 
the draft articles [See General Assembly 
resolution 63/124]. At the fifty-ninth session, 
in 2007, the Working Group on Shared 
Natural Resources, chaired by Enrique 
Candioti, discussed the issue of oil and gas 
resources on the basis of the fourth report 
[A/CN.4/580]
 
 submitted by the Special 
Rapporteur, Mr. Chusei Yamada. In addition 
to determining that the law of transboundary 
aquifers should be addressed separately from 
issues concerning oil and gas resources, the 
Commission decided to request the 
Secretariat to circulate to Governments a 
questionnaire on the subject prepared by the 
Working Group [Fifty-ninth Session, 
Supplement No. 10 (A/59/10), paras. 161-
183]. 
 At the sixty-first session, in 2009, the 
Working Group discussed the feasibility of 
any future work by the Commission on the 
issue of oil and gas resources on the basis of 
a working paper on oil and gas, which had 
been prepared by Mr. Yamada before he 
resigned from the Commission. The Working 
Group decided to have the 2007 
questionnaire recirculated and to entrust the 
further sessions with the responsibility of 
preparing a study in which the feasibility of 
any future work by the Commission on oil 
and gas would be determined through the 
analysis of written replies from Governments 
and their comments and observations in the 
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, as 
well as other relevant elements [Sixty-fourth 
Session of the General Assembly, 
Supplement No. 10 (A/64/10), paras. 187-
193]. 
 At the sixty-first session, in 2010, as 
the last session held for the topic of shared 
natural resources, the commission reviewed 
the 39 replies and observation of 
governments signifying that the viewpoints 
from majority of Member States concerning 
the issue of oil and gas were greatly negative 
[Sixty-first Session of the General Assembly, 
Supplement No. 10 (A/64/10)]. A majority 
believed that the question was not only 
fundamentally bilateral in nature, but also 
highly technical, involving various regional 
situations. That is to say the specific and 
complex issues related to shared oil and gas 
reserves had been adequately addressed for a 
number of years through bilateral cooperation 
and mutually agreed arrangements, and thus 
did not seem to be giving rise to insoluble 
problems in practice. It was particularly 
important to distinguish the physical or 
geological characteristics of oil and gas from 
the legal evaluation of those resources, and 
also to note that, as far as oil and natural gas 
were concerned, each case had its own 
specific and distinct features and would need 
to be addressed separately .
24 
 Doubts were thus expressed as to the 
need for the Commission to proceed with any 
codification process relating to this issue, 
including the development of universal rules. 
It was feared that an attempt at generalization 
might inadvertently lead to additional 
complexity and confusion in an area that had 
been adequately addressed through bilateral 
efforts to manage it. Given that oil and gas 
reserves were often located in continental 
shelves, maritime boundary delimitation, 
which, in political terms, was a very delicate 
and sensitive issue for the States concerned, 
was a prerequisite for the consideration of 
this topic, unless the parties had mutually 
agreed, as in a limited number of cases, to 
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bypass the problem of delimitation [Sixty-
Second Session of the General Assembly, 
Supplement No. 10 (A/CN.4/621), paras. 16]. 
 A few States expressed their view on 
State practice concerning oil and gas that 
should be reviewed precisely because of the 
specificities of each case having its specific 
circumstance or the commission after 
reviewing states practice and other 
interpretations elaborate a model agreement 
on the topic. The delicate and profound 
nature of specific relevant cases could well 
be expected to hinder any attempt at 
adequately broad and useful analysis of the 
issues involved.  
 Eventually, Shinya Murase, the author 
of the paper [A/CN.4/621] recommends that 
the Working Group decided, at the sixty-
second session of the Commission, in 2010, 
that the topic of oil and gas will not be 
pursued any further. It may be recalled once 
again, since such a decision is not without 
precedent in the practice of the Commission 
[Sixty-Second Session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/CN.4/621), paras. 17]. 
 What is inferred in the work of ILC is 
that they have not got any success in 
providing law for the topic shared oil and gas 
resources. The mere procedure to be followed 
is focusing on states practice and regional 
arrangements in the form of joint 
development and unitization agreement to 
draw the common aspects along with 
procedures that plays the role of a guidelines 
for states to practice their interest in a shared 
petroleum deposit .
25 
CODIFICATION OF A MODEL 
AGREEMENT AS RULES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE ILC 
In the last four decades, international law 
commission (ILC) commenced its work on 
Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses which was succeeded in 
codification and adoption of a set of the 
convention on the law for this subject. In 
2000, the ILC included the work on shared 
natural resource in its long-term programme 
of work and succeeded in second law 
codified and adopted for the law of 
transboundary aquifers (2008). At the time of 
drafting, the Convention on the Law of Non-
Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (1997), the ILC work group 
concluded not to include confined 
groundwaters (transboundary aquifer) which 
are unrelated to surface waters from the topic, 
but nonetheless the working group concluded 
to continue the subject of transboundary 
aquifers in a separate study [The Work of 
The International Law Commission, 2012]. 
The same decision happened before the 
drafting of the law of transboundary aquifers, 
the ILC referred to the questionnaires sent to 
the States and reported that majority of the 
States recognised that the law of 
transboundary aquifers should be coped 
within separate document from oil and gas. 
The reasons for this decision originates from 
the fact that these subjects are significantly 
different technically, commercially, 
economically, environmentally and socially 
[the ILC Fifth Report on Shared Natural 
Resources, A/CN.4/591]. 
 The ILC in the law of transboundary 
aquifers recognised the sovereignty of each 
State over a part of any aquifer system 
situated within its territory. In this law, it is 
emphasized that the States should implement 
such resources in compliance with the 
principle of equitable and reasonable 
exploitation and utilisation. It also obliges the 
States to establish joint arrangements and 
mechanisms of cooperation based on 
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, 
sustainable development, mutual benefit and 
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good faith [the ILC Fifth Report on Shared 
Natural Resources, A/CN.4/591].   
 The analogous rules could not be used 
for shared oil and gas deposits because they 
are non-renewable resources and exploration 
and exploitation of such resources are greatly 
different from the other resources based on 
economic worth. Eventually the ILC 
concluded not to continue the codification of 
a set of law or a model agreement for 
cooperative development of shared oil and 
gas resources for the reasons that some of 
such resources located in the disputed area 
and also each case and circumstances of 
shared oil and gas resources is specific and 
this specificities would rise a complexity to 
applicably synthesize a model agreement 
[Sixty-Second Session, Supplement No. 10 
(A/CN.4/621)]. The problem arises to choose 
a joint development system when the States 
have different national legal and economic 
system, oil and gas law or Petroleum law and 
also different oil and gas development regime 
adopted or practiced by them. Adjustment of 
such differences to select an appropriate 
regime is complicated and the existing 
approach might not be interesting for some 
states and would not be able to gain a 
universal acceptance. 
 William Onorato argued on his work 
(1968) that there is ample reason for an 
international technical convention 
establishing uniform exploitation procedures 
reflecting accepted standards of good oil field 
practice which should apply where several 
countries are found to be tapping the same oil 
deposit. Onorato continued that an 
international codification such proved 
practices and procedures would be a useful 
first step towards providing a basis for even 
greater co-operation. An alternative step, 
however, would be to reach an international 
accord providing for unitized operations 
between countries .
26 
 The joint authority model is 
considered as the most comprehensive 
system of joint development as a 
supranational joint entities equipped with 
legal personalities and autonomy to 
undertake the role of the States parties [See 
three models of the States practice in section 
2 of this paper]. The following justifications 
support the reason why the joint 
administrative commission (JAC) or joint 
authority is thought up as one of the vital 
aspects in the existing model agreement:  
1. This Administrative body is an 
independent international 
commission. 
2. It is supranational joint entities that 
can be relied on as an impartial third 
party. 
3. The organisational functions can be 
adjusted to the requirements of any 
specific circumstances affecting that 
particular shared deposit.    
4. It is granted legal personality and 
autonomy.  
5. It do not tackle sovereign rights of the 
States owing to be consisted of 
adequate legal administrative 
authorities as the members from each 
States parties.  
6. This commission of wide-ranging 
power and decision-making mandates 
supervise over all aspects of the joint 
development zone. 
7. In the occasion of potential changes 
of circumstances and necessity of 
amendment, it would be the best tool 
and resort to overcome them and 
proceed the development plan. 
 
The ILC by its working group which is 
competent enough to work  on complexity of 
shared oil and gas resources would study 
precisely the main principles and provisions 
of such model agreement that are inferred 
from weaknesses and strengths of petroleum 
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agreements and the agreement between the 
States for development of shared oil and gas 
fields. To overcome the specificities of each 
case occurring in different marine or onshore 
locations, the ILC should codify a provision 
that the States have to establish their 
administrative commission as the decision-
making body of the joint development 
agreement, prior to the final agreement. This 
decision-making board of experts from the 
interested States would be able to overcome 
any intricacy and specificities that might 
occur in their continental shelf, Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) or equidistance 
boundary and especially determination of the 
Joint Development Zone (JDZ). In this 
regards, after overcoming and resolving this 
crucial step, the codification of other 
provisions of the agreement would be 
applicable easier. 
 The ILC also in its codification of a 
convention should categorize all steps the 
states must observe accordingly. Pre-
negotiation and negotiation period, 
establishment of Joint Authority or Joint 
Commission, determination of the joint 
development zone and finally formal 
execution of the main agreement signed 
between two or more states. The interested 
States in the first stage (pre-negotiation and 
negotiation period) would be obliged to 
observe the following rules that are 
originated from international law sources. 
These rules get obligatory and binding when 
they are codified in a convention that have 
entered into force. These rules are as follows: 
1. To exchange information and prior 
consultation [UN GA Resolution 3281 
(XXIX). Article 4(5-6) of the United 
States of America and Mexico 
Delimitation agreement 2000 affirms 
this obligation]. 
2. To avoid exploratory actions leading 
to permanent changes in the 
environment 
3. To agree upon temporary measures in 
the light of understanding and 
cooperation 
4. To avoid any action that would impair 
the process of reaching a final 
agreement  
5. To respect the rights and interests of 
any costal states  
6. Not to cause considerable damage 
7. To agree on optimum use of such 
resources 
8. Appropriate compensation for any 
exploitation from a shared reservoir 
without any prior notice to the other 
party [Article 4(2) of France and 
Spain Delimitation Agreement 1974, 
Article 2(2) Netherlands & Germany 
Delimitation Agreement 1971. 
Determination of the area around 
boundary line is also reflected in Iran 
and Qatar and Iran and Saudi Arabia 
Delimitation Agreement]. 
9. To determine the area around the 
boundary line not to be exploited for a 
specific period [Article 4 of the United 
States of America and Mexico 
Delimitation agreement 2000]. 
The ILC in the context of the potential 
convention should enumerate and formulate a 
set of provisions as the next step for the 
establishment of the joint commission. In this 
regard, the States transfer the duty of 
negotiation and coming to an agreement to 
their established joint commission. It is given 
legal personality by the states and it is a board 
of influential figures from each States to find 
practical solution for the States parties and as 
the most optimal mechanism to resolve any 
dispute regarding continental shelf, 
delimitation or determination of Joint 
Development Zone (JDZ). Such transnational 
commission regardless to bestowing legal 
personality, and adequate and reasonable 
autonomy to undertake its required functions, 
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is granted with exploration and exploitation 
rights, legal and contractual management and 
settlement of dispute, preparation of 
enforcement instrument and applicable law, 
protection of health, safety and environment, 
collection and apportionment of revenues and 
taxes, and financial management and all other 
competences bestowed under the decision of 
the States Parties. More extended powers or 
less autonomy of joint entities depend on the 
States decision and the complexity, the stretch 
of the JDZ and amount of resources in the 
JDZ and the area. The more the area is 
complex and the resources is huge, the more 
comprehensive and detailed joint 
administrative commission (JAC) shall be. 
The joint commission should consist of 
subsidiary committee in the following crucial 
matters of the joint development agreement; 
Petroleum Development Committee, 
Economic and Financial Committee, Legal 
Committee, Health Safety Security and 
Environment Committee, Administration, 
Human Resource and Logistic Committee. 
 The International Law Commission 
would regard the following circumstances to 
codify appropriate rules and provisions for 
each status of the determination of the Joint 
Development Zone (JDZ): 
1. JDZ might overlap the sovereign area 
of a third party 
2. JDZ and potential overlapping area 
within the zone or out of the zone 
3. JDZ in delimited boundaries 
4. Pre-existing Concessions and Rights 
in the JDZ 
5. Division of the Zone into Separate 
Blocks 
6. The Resources in Joint Development 
Zone. 
 
The ILC in the formulation of the convention 
would consider the above circumstances and 
regulate through comprehensive provisions in 
the part of the determination of the joint 
development zone in a potential convention. 
Thus, the ILC should consider and include 
most of the significant circumstances and 
statuses arising from the specific location of 
the shared oil and gas resources straddling 
the States boundary and regulate and 
formulate the relevant rules for determination 
of the JDZ. In the other section and parts of 
the convention, the ILC working group is 
proposed to consider the other crucial matters 
as the skeleton of the convention and model 
agreement, summarized as follows: 
1. Joint Development Zone: it 
determines the area to be jointly 
developed under the agreement is 
another column of the agreement. 
2. Joint Administrative Commission 
(JAC): this regulatory body is the 
supranational organization which is 
established under the joint 
development agreement to manage all 
activities and aspects of the 
agreement pertaining to the JDZ. 
3. Joint Development Regime: it defines 
what mechanism as a whole leading 
all aspects and principles of the 
agreement and is reflected in the JDZ 
Plan. 
4. Exploration and Exploitation in JDZ: 
the system under which the JDZ is 
going to be explored and exploited 
covers operations pertaining to all 
petroleum activities. This is also 
reflected in the JDZ Plan.  
5. Revenue Sharing: It is the most 
fundamental aspect of the agreement 
as the main goal of the States for joint 
sharing of petroleum production the 
JDZ as a whole. 
6. Financial Arrangements and Fiscal 
Policies: the initial and general accord 
regarding financial and fiscal regime 
would be regulated in the joint 
development t agreement and in 
operational and practical phases of the 
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development plan, it would be 
supervise and necessarily revised by 
the joint administrative commission 
(JAC). Cost obligations and taxation 
system are the columns of financial 
aspects the joint development 
agreement model which is going to be 
broadened in details. 
7. Surveillance of Petroleum 
Exploitation: It includes all standards 
and strategies concerning 
conservative regulation of petroleum 
activities such as conservation law, 
correlative rights, production 
regulation, wells spacing regulations, 
maximum efficient rate, Production 
and marketing regulation, pooling and 
unitization law. 
8. Governing Law: it designates the 
specific legal framework for the joint 
development including criminal 
jurisdiction, jurisdiction and 
enforcement, petroleum law 
codification under the joint 
development agreement and other 
legal aspect of the agreement. The 
main sources of law ruling the 
agreement are; the Agreement itself, 
Petroleum Codes and development 
contract.  
9. Settlement of Dispute: this provision 
determines the ways and options of 
the processing inter-state dispute or 
disputes between private parties. 
10. Health, Safety and Security Rules and 
Protection of Marine Environment: It 
includes standards and rules adopted 
from the States Parties legal system 
and international law rules and 
standards drafted and prepared by the 
relevant committee in the joint 
administrative commission (JAC).  
11. Final Clauses: Entry into Force, 
Duration of the Development, 
Amendment, confidentiality, rights of 
the third Party and so on.  
The ILC in codification of the convention on 
the law of shared oil and gas resources would 
include the above-mentioned the fundamental 
provisions of the joint development 
agreement between the States. These 
principles become a base for the convention 
framework. The ILC would attached a Model 
Agreements as an annex to the convention as 
a comprehensive rules to oblige the States. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The attempt of the ILC to formulate a set of 
law or a model agreement for development of 
shared oil and gas resources was in vain. In 
fact, the work group made a hasty decision 
where it could have continued the process by 
implementation of a committee consists of 
members and experts from the successful 
States in application of the joint development 
agreement and scholars and authors of this 
subject and also call for cooperation of the 
other organisations such as United Nations 
Institute for Training and Research 
(UNITAR) or International Development 
Law Organization (IDLO) or the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) and the Gas Exporting 
Countries Forum (GECF). The subject of 
shared oil and gas resources requires vast and 
great attempt as much as famous and 
complicated conventions took years and 
decades to be finalized and adopted formally. 
Moreover, such convention would be feasible 
and applicable, through implementation of a 
competent committee in the subject of the 
joint development of shared oil and gas 
resources and long-term programme of work 
and study,  
 Practicability and feasibility of this 
framework has priority over ideality of it. 
Workable approach is a preference in this 
potential convention and model agreement by 
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the ILC. In accomplishment of this approach, 
the ILC committee or work group can 
implement the existing and old joint 
development agreements, international 
unitization agreements and also petroleum act 
of some developed countries and their oil and 
gas laws and management strategy and all 
petroleum industry practices as reference and 
inspiration. It does not mean such a 
convention or model would be derived 
merely from any particular joint development 
agreement or states practice. The ILC is 
experienced in synthesizing and codifying 
ample of conventions and sets of law and by 
using such competencies, it would be able to 
formulate a comprehensive convention to 
cover all complicated aspects of 
transboundary oil and gas resources as 
enumerated and clarified in the last section of 
this paper which would be a step forward for 
energy efficiency and energy conservation, 
environmental protection and development of 
international law and the world peace and 
security that can be achieved by development 
of international law and relevant organisation 
such as International law commission (ILC) 
and even United Nations Institute for 
Training and Research (UNITAR) or 
International Development Law Organization 
(IDLO).  
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